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THE CHURCH AND THE MILITARY IN CHILE: PROGRESSIVE  
OR RETROGRESSIVE

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IN CHILE:  
PROGRESSIVE OR RETROGRESSIVE?

by

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The basic questions which this essay explores are whether the Church and the military in Chile have historically been and are currently progressive or retrogressive institutions. Data was gathered using a literature search, including abstracts in the New York Times Information Bank. This data indicates that the Church consciously and deliberately left a retrogressive past around 1950, and in the 1970s has proven to be a solidly progressive institution with a bright future. The military was one of Latin America's most progressive for a century, especially because of its professionalism and noninterference in politics. It reached its professional zenith in 1970 when it refused to overturn the election of Marxist Salvadore Allende as president. In the midst of political and economic chaos in 1973, however, the military reluctantly seized the government--suddenly becoming a retrogressive institution characterized by repressive, anti-democratic policies and general ineptitude. Unlike the Church, the military's future appears bleak.

## INTRODUCTION

The international spotlight which focused so intensely on Chile earlier in this decade has shifted elsewhere. Chile's dramatic experiment with Marxist Socialism--unique in that a solidly democratic society elected a Marxist government--is finished. The bloody overthrow of Salvadore Allende in September 1973 ushered in, for Chile, a type of government common in Latin America--military dictatorship. To the world press, Chile now probably seems "weary, stale, flat and unprofitable," to use Hamlet's phrase. No wonder the spotlight has shifted.

In the gradual development of Chilean democracy and in its sudden demise, two institutions have played significant roles, namely, the Roman Catholic Church and the military. The purpose of this essay is to examine the changing relationships of these two institutions to Chile and to consider whether their impacts on Chilean politics and life have become progressive or retrogressive. Chapter one will set the stage for this study by pointing out democratic and anti-democratic tendencies in Chilean history up to the mid-twentieth century. Chapters two and three will examine the roles played by the Church and the military in the past quarter century, particularly in the 1970s, and, finally, chapter four will draw some conclusions concerning what their roles might be in the future.

## CHAPTER I

### DEMOCRATIC AND ANTI-DEMOCRATIC

### TENDENCIES IN CHILEAN HISTORY

It was the best of times, it was the worst of times,...  
it was the season of light, it was the season of darkness,  
it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair.

Charles Dickens, A Tale of Two Cities

The year 1925 epitomizes Chilean history after gaining independence from Spain; the events of that year capture the essence of both the preceeding one hundred and the succeeding fifty years. Democratic and anti-democratic forces alike surged ahead in Chile--and each seemed to win in spite of the other. The seeds of the democratic turn toward Marxism in 1970 and the military coup of 1973, although sown in the nineteenth century, sprouted suddenly and blossomed in the heady year 1925. Thus, to understand 1925 is to comprehend the soul and spirit of Chilean history.

Two pivotal, contradictory events occurred in that year: the writing of a new, more solidly democratic constitution, and the seizure of government by military leaders. When viewing a century and a half of political development, most scholars have seen the sweep of Chilean history as progressively democratic,<sup>1</sup> with the adoption of the Constitution of 1925 standing out as a keystone event. The military takeover (1925-1931), accordingly, is seen as merely an atypical interlude in the otherwise steady rise of democracy. The military dictatorship established two years ago, however, may force a reassessment of that judgment.

Which event in 1925 has, indeed, more long-term significance for the twentieth century?

The Constitution of 1925, Chile's third since her independence in 1818, builds on and draws heavily from the previous two. The first was written in 1822 by Chilean hero Bernardo O'Higgins, who had defeated the Spanish four years earlier. Although he wrote the first constitution, as dictator, he nevertheless ruled by decree. The socially progressive aspect of his leadership was demonstrated in his taxation of wealthy landowners to build schools and roads, an action which earned their wrath. In addition, he did away with their Spanish titles and attempted to break up their big estates. A year later, after abolishing slavery, O'Higgins was forced to resign; the landowners had had more than enough of him. The strange mixture of democratic and anti-democratic elements so prevalent in 1925 can thus be clearly seen much earlier in the character and work of Bernardo O'Higgins.

Eleven years after the first constitution was written, a second one was adopted. The key actor was Diego Portales, who ruled Chile as dictator from 1823 until his assassination in 1837. The basic thrust of this new constitution--which would greatly influence Chilean life for decades--was to provide Chile with a strong presidency elected by a congress. In addition, while granting many powers to the Roman Catholic Church, it limited suffrage to a rather small portion of the population: literate male property owners over 25. Thus the basic strength of the government came from the backing it received from the Church and the aristocracy.



It is worth noting, once again, that a dictator was the guiding democratic light at a crucial point in Chilean history.

The Constitution of 1925, although more evolutionary than revolutionary, created significant structural changes in Chilean political life. First, it reestablished the strong executive authority of the previous constitution, an authority which had been seriously eroded in the latter half of the nineteenth century, particularly in 1891 when Congress seized power and adopted a parliamentary system. Second, it considerably broadened the base of democracy by granting suffrage to all literate males 21 years of age and older--regardless of whether they owned property. And third, it no longer recognized the Roman Catholic Church as the official State Church. In addition, the Constitution established free schools and made public welfare a governmental responsibility. Chile's president in that year was Arturo Alessandri Palma. Although he was forced into exile in that same year by the military, he returned to power in 1932 and expanded the Constitution two years later by giving women the right to vote.

The Church's reaction to the Constitution of 1925 was predictable; the Church was very much against the change which would cost it the place of privilege it traditionally had enjoyed. Although Archbishop Crecente Errazuriz was an active exponent of the social principles of Pope Leo XIII (Rerum Novarum) and supported Alessandri's labor laws, the Church generally resisted the democratic progress which inhered in the Constitution. Having legitimized secular authority for centuries in Chilean history--Spanish conquerors, Chilean dictators and elected presidents alike--the Church fought hard against the radical change of status which the

new Constitution gave it. To be in favor of the Constitution was obviously to be against God.<sup>2</sup> This Church was, of course, a pre-Vatican II Church; in spite of Archbishop Crecente, it was generally paternalistic and authoritarian--dominated by the interests and mentality of the aristocratic, landholding classes. The judgment that the Church in 1925--and indeed the first half of the twentieth century--was a socially retrogressive Church is easy to make. In the light of recent developments in the Church, it is a judgment the Church itself would make with regret.

The reaction of the military establishment to the Constitution of 1925 was one of political disinterest and noninvolvement--as a matter of long-standing tradition and policy. This tradition developed partially because its leaders came from the ruling class.

In this respect Chile bears a resemblance to nineteenth century Europe where...the military did not intervene in the political process because of its recruitment from the ruling class. The officers thus identified their interest with the interests of those in control of the state's administrative structure.<sup>3</sup>

Two other factors, however, also account for this tradition: professionalization and conscription.

Professionalization began in the late 1880's under the leadership of German Army Captain Emil Koerner, the Baron von Steuben of Chile, who introduced Prussian training methods into the Chilean Army. This was the Army which had won great military victories over Peru and Bolivia shortly before in the War of the Pacific, 1879-1883, in which it gained for Chile the rich northern nitrate and copper territory and for itself enormous national pop-

ularity. Bolstering its defense capability doubtless motivated the Army to accept the drive toward professionalization under Koerner.

Conscription was introduced in 1900. It served to democratize the Army by placing the military leadership in closer touch with the common people and by militating against the growth of a disproportionately large body of elitist, professional soldiers.<sup>4</sup> The result, uncommon in Latin America, was a solid tradition of military non-intervention in politics.

Military leaders, however, seized the government in 1925, led by Carlos Ibanez, who subsequently ruled as dictator until 1931. The causes were basically more economic than political. During World War I neutral Chile had expanded its industries, mainly to meet wartime demand for nitrates to produce explosives. After the war, unemployment spread; strikes and riots created a state of social chaos and political rebellion:

Actual intervention in political affairs by the military did not take place until the civilian governments seemed totally incapable of making decisions to alleviate this crisis.<sup>5</sup>

Military intervention in 1925 might thus better be seen as an honest attempt at restoration; it was carried out reluctantly, and was strongly supported by popular opinion. Popular support, however, dwindled as the worldwide depression continued, and Ibanez was forced into exile in 1931.<sup>6</sup> At that time political power reverted to civil authorities and the Army returned to its professional functions. Democratic values, rooted in the Constitution of 1925, rather than anti-democratic values inhering in the military intervention of that year, won the victory. Or so it seemed for almost fifty years.

## CHAPTER II

### THE ROLE OF THE CHURCH SINCE MID-CENTURY

"Old things are passed away; behold, all things are becoming new."

II Corinthians 5: 17

"Faith without works is dead."

James 2: 26

The Constitution of 1925 altered the relationship of Church and state. The wall of separation which the Constitution built gave to the Church an independence which strengthened rather than weakened it. The loss of official status as State Church gradually changed the way the Church saw itself and its mission in Chile; instead of being the ruling, lordly Church it became the servant Church--serving Chile by independently supporting or criticizing the government and by demonstrating concern for the social and economic needs of the people.

Change came slowly. Around mid-century fresh winds of creative thought began to blow within the Church. Although the criticism that the Church in Chile--and throughout Latin America--helped to maintain an anachronistic social and economic system was probably valid before mid-century,

Yet today no institution in Latin America is changing more rapidly than the Catholic Church, and in directions that have important implications not only for defining new relationships between Christianity and the values of society, but also for the role that the Church will play in the region's development.<sup>7</sup>

The change did not center in the eternal doctrines which the Church had proclaimed for centuries, but rather in the temporal applications

of these doctrines in Chilean life.

Whenever an institution undergoes dramatic change, several contributing factors are usually present. One of these factors will inevitably be its leadership. So it was in the Chilean Church:

Since the 1950's there has been a determined effort on the part of the Church's leadership to change its traditional image. It was the feeling of this progressive leadership that the Church, as one of the country's major social institutions, should play a more significant role in its social, economic, and political development.<sup>8</sup>

Although some priests within the Church remained very conservative--and others captured headlines by demonstrating vocally for radical left-wing causes--the progressive views of the Chilean bishops set the tone for the Church. These bishops, relatively small in number, met frequently to discuss common problems; in their declarations they presented a unified image both to the Church and society.

Raul Cardinal Silva Henriquez, Archbishop of Santiago, was the dominant leader. In his 9,000-word pastoral letter of 21 October 1962, read in all Roman Catholic Churches in Chile, he said, in essence, that Chile should overhaul its unbalanced social system and make great changes to ease the lot of millions of underprivileged persons. Otherwise the job would be done in a totalitarian manner by Communist methods.

It is much easier to denounce the social and economic evils of the age than to practice the enlightened policies one preaches. This was particularly true for a Church which had grown rich and powerful

because of its privileged status in society for several hundred years. The fact that the Church now began to speak out for basic societal changes--agrarian reform, for example--was in itself remarkable, but what underscored the seriousness with which the Church spoke were the actions which followed: Bishop Larraine of Talca instituted land reform on land belonging to the Church in his diocese and Cardinal Silva quickly followed suit in Santiago. As a result, a conservative-liberal controversy erupted within the Church, and rich landowners throughout Chile rose up in alarm at the threat they realistically perceived. But the progressive spirit could not be thwarted; the Church took its prophetic mission seriously and insisted on being understood in those terms.

The bishops did not develop their progressive ideology in an ecclesiastical vacuum; they relied heavily on the social scientists and Jesuit intellectuals of the scholarly Centro Bellarmino Social Research Institute for advice in developing their positions. The Centro was particularly interested in land reform, birth control and liturgical renewal, but it was only one of a number of institutions engaged in scientific research. These research centers produced a number of scholarly publications. The genius of the bishops was that they thrived in the intellectual ferment which blossomed in Chile. Galileo should have been living in such days.

The bishops were connected to more than local scholarship, however; they were part of one of the world's largest and most influential supranational "corporations"--the Roman Catholic Church--which itself had undergone change, especially in the era of Pope

John XXIII. His concern for social justice and openness to new ideas is well known. The Chilean Church--scholars and bishops alike--listened carefully to the Pope:

In the course of the preceeding decade a series of papal pronouncements had given impetus and respectability to the idea of social reform. These pronouncements had special echoes in Chile, where there already existed an important colony of progressive foreign Jesuits and, within the domestic Church hierarchy, a strong tendency toward social Christianity.<sup>9</sup>

If the bishops looked to Rome, Rome also looked to Latin America in general and Chile in particular. In 1968 Pope Paul VI visited Medellin, Colombia, to convene the influential Latin American Bishop's Council, established in 1956 to solve common social problems--a Council in which the Chilean bishops participated vigorously. Three years later, during the rule of Salvadore Allende, Pope Paul exhorted Chile to respect its Catholic traditions and to maintain good relations with the Church. And when Allende was over-turned in 1973, Pope Paul expressed the hope that Chile would be spared civil war.<sup>10</sup> Thus the cosmopolitan nature of the Church contributed to and reinforced the progressive spirit of the bishops. They did not stand alone--in Chile or the world.

The election of Marxist Salvadore Allende in September 1970 placed the Church in a difficult position. The conservative-liberal antagonisms which had been simmering within it for two decades boiled over into a controversy which pitted its political right and left wings against each other. On the one side, young rightist Catholics issued pamphlets asking Pope Paul to oppose the Allende election.<sup>11</sup> On the other side, a few months later, eighty leftist

priests declared their commitment to assist President Allende in constructing a Socialist state in Chile:

The Church cannot be apolitical. We categorically pronounce ourselves for a Socialist system, which constitutes the only way to escape from underdevelopment.<sup>12</sup>

But what position would the Church's leadership finally take?

The official answer came on 24 April 1971. Chile's bishops, in a national plenary assembly in Santiago, issued a declaration affirming the Church's duty to work with legitimate government for the amelioration of human misery. At the same time, however, they denounced the leftist priests' declaration on the grounds that Marxism had historically denied human rights just as capitalism had, and that the clergy should abstain from publicly taking sides with political parties to avoid returning to "a clericalism which has been overcome and which no one wishes to see reappear."<sup>13</sup> The Church would thus remain politically concerned and active without aligning itself with the government in power--supporting the progressive programs of any government, but implying by its independence that it would not be uncritical of the government.

Shortly after the military overthrow of Allende in September 1973, the Church's stance was tested once again--on the questions both of cooperation and criticism. The bishops offered to cooperate with the ruling junta in the reconstruction of the country but expressed deep concern over the continuing violence and authoritarian actions of the military.<sup>14</sup> A year later, on the first anniversary of the military take over, the critical spirit remained:



The leaders of the Catholic Church have criticized the junta for the climate of hatred that still persists and asked that it put an end to the "state of war" which officially still exists against the left. And when the junta stages a giant rally on Santiago's Plaza Italia this week to mark the first anniversary of its rule, there will be no special masses nor ringing of church bells to celebrate the event.<sup>15</sup>

For the past quarter century the Roman Catholic Church has demonstrated that it has its own positive agenda for building a better country. It has witnessed during the past five years the storms and stresses of radically changing government leadership; yet it has been secure enough to be guided by its own internal values rather than the values of the government, refusing to identify Christianity with a particular economic system--whether Marxist or capitalist. It has thus clearly left its retrogressive past to become a progressive force to be reckoned with in Chile.

### CHAPTER III

#### THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY SINCE MID-CENTURY

Some are born great, some achieve greatness,  
and some have greatness thrust upon 'em.

William Shakespeare, "Twelfth Night"

At mid-century the Armed Forces of Chile were near the peak of their prestige--both within and outside the country. And for good reasons: they had been victorious sixty years earlier in a war which had enlarged the country and brought much-needed economic strength in the form of nitrate and copper; they had increased their professionalism with the help of European expertise; they had broadened their manpower base through conscription; and in 1932 they had returned governmental leadership to civilian authority. Unlike the military of so many Latin American countries, the Chilean military, with professional zeal, stayed out of politics for decades--and remained highly popular with the people. By following reasonable policies over the course of many years, it had achieved greatness in Latin America.

The Armed Forces stayed on the progressive and professional heights for forty years. Their reaction to the election of Salvador Allende in 1970 reinforced rather than established their discipline, strength, stability--and class. For no other country in history had ever freely elected a Marxist president, whereas almost every country in Latin America had seen its Armed Forces seize the government for less cause than that. Nevertheless, the long-standing Chilean military policy of noninvolvement in politics and of positive support

for the democratic electoral process outweighed any unhappiness they might have had with the results of the election. They refused to overturn it.

For a variety of reasons, Allende's leadership brought gradual economic and political chaos to the country.<sup>16</sup> In order to build confidence and to solve grave national problems, Allende brought into his cabinet in October 1972 General Carlos Prats, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Prats insisted that he accepted only because constitutionality and stability were wavering, and that the policy of political noninterference had not changed.<sup>17</sup> From his point of view, joining the government was merely another way of supporting the democratic will of the people. His action, however, divided the military:

The Armed Forces themselves were in a dilemma. Many of them were preoccupied with maintaining their professionalism. For Prats and a minority of officers, this meant sustaining the constitutional Allende regime....For a majority, however, this meant staying out of the cabinet to avoid becoming partners in the policies of a predominantly Marxist government.<sup>18</sup>

It was obvious at the time that Prats joined--or backed into--the government reluctantly; it is equally obvious, by hindsight, that he was thereby caught up in a historical process which he was helpless to stop: the Armed Forces became major political actors. Whether discussions centered on strengthening the Allende regime or saving the democratic system in Chile, their active role was assumed as crucial. On 23 August 1973 General Prats attempted to eliminate criticism and to reverse the momentum of events by

resigning both from the Army and the Cabinet. General Augusto Pinochet, the new Commander-in-Chief, headed the junta which overthrew Allende only three weeks later. In spite of the coup, it might be said fairly that the military neither sought nor seized the national leadership; leadership--and the possibility of further greatness--was thrust upon it by the deterioration and disarray which existed at the time.

A year later those who still supported the junta emphasized the good it had done: economically crippling strikes had been abolished and the demonstrations and illegal seizures of property so prevalent in the tumultuous Allende years had been ended. Even those who opposed the junta admitted that their country had been saved from almost certain civil war. But under the generals, Chile suffered a disastrous loss of that which was once so important, namely, democratic values. The price Chileans are paying for military law and order is well documented:

Political parties no longer operate, congress has been disbanded, and as many as 8,000 political prisoners are locked away, often in remote places.<sup>19</sup>

They see their mission as one of national recuperation, but define it largely in negative terms--against Marxism, against any political parties, against participation, against Congress, against a free press.<sup>20</sup>

The universities, now under military control, have eliminated social-science chairs whenever possible, because of the military's deep-seated distrust of social science and its practitioners.<sup>21</sup>

The greatness the military had once known has quickly dissipated; the possibility of further greatness daily becomes more improbable. Anti-democratic values are alive and well in Chile.

If the military junta is not governing well, the reasons are not hard to find. In the first place, the long-standing Chilean policy of nonintervention in political affairs was accompanied logically enough by a lack of planning for intervention. In an insightful article in the Saturday Review/World,<sup>22</sup> Fay Haussman points out that the top military schools of Chile, unlike those of Brazil and Peru, did not educate their students to govern the country. Those non-military courses which the Chileans taught were at a much lower level of sophistication than those taught at the national war colleges of other countries or at civilian universities. Thus the senior military officers who make up the present ruling junta bring professional military skills and virtues rather than civilian training to their unexpected task of governing the country.

In the second place, the military junta is made up of older military officers whose vision is affected by a too simplistic cold war mentality. Many events throughout Latin America have understandably served to fortify that mentality--especially in Castro's Cuba and Allende's Chile. Although the junta has emphatically promised to return the country to its traditional democratic way of life, the road it is following is a familiar one in Latin America, one which denies fundamental human rights across a broad societal spectrum. Since Latin American countries share a political con-

sciousness which makes developments in one country of direct influence elsewhere, it would not be surprising to see the junta follow the Brazilian model of clinging tenaciously to power--"until the problems are resolved"--while professing love for democratic ideals.

The most open and frequent opposition to the junta has come from the Roman Catholic Church, which is now the main vehicle of dissent in Chile. The Church established an office of human rights to investigate violations of justice and to report these violations to the Chilean people. The style of opposition which Cardinal Silva has carefully chosen, however, might best be called "reconciliation" rather than "confrontation." For example, he has offered the junta the same independent cooperation which he had previously offered the Allende regime: the cooperation would be positive but not uncritical, and the criticism would be both firm and vocal.<sup>23</sup>

After remaining on the heights of prestige for decades, the Chilean military reluctantly seized power in order to save the nation from political and economic ruin. Although a measure of order has been restored, the military's fundamental misunderstanding and mishandling of human rights and democratic processes have caused its popularity to plunge precipitously. The institution which was once proudly progressive must now be labeled "retrogressive." It has quickly lost the prestige it once had earned and the possibility of greatness thrust upon it. Instead of remaining Latin America's England, where a broad spectrum of political activity has been allowed, Chile has suddenly become its Portugal.

#### CHAPTER IV

#### CONCLUSIONS: FUTURE ROLES OF THE CHURCH AND THE MILITARY IN CHILE

Not to promote war, but to preserve peace.

Elihu Root: US Army War College Motto

Predicting the future in a fast-changing world is difficult--too many unexpected variables of persons and events can upset the most logical forecasts. Who, for example, could have predicted in 1970 that Chile, of all countries, would have a repressive military government by 1973? Nevertheless, a number of trends in Chilean and in world history which have been noted in this essay are suggestive of future directions of both the Church and the military in Chile for the next twenty-five years. Perhaps the best way to attempt to draw a bead on the future is to sight along a line which extends from the past through the present.

The Church in Chile has consciously rejected an aspect of its past, namely, its lack of social action rooted in social consciousness and concern. At the same time, it has consistently affirmed another aspect of its past, namely, its cosmopolitan nature, especially its connection to Rome. The locus of authority in the Church is thus international rather than national, a fact which should continue to promote stability of perspective and policy no matter how uncertain the times. These two factors, coupled with the Church's interest in and willingness to act on the recommendations of locally tailored social science scholarship, suggest that the Church will continue to be a progressive, independent force in Chile for years to come.

The most important unknown factor which could alter this prognosis is the change in leadership which will inevitably come. The Church's leadership is an integral part of Chilean society and contains the same right and left-wing minorities which are seen in society. If, on the one hand, the progressive leadership is replaced by ultra-conservative leaders, the Church faces the danger of becoming too closely identified with right-wing governments or of adopting a position of confrontation toward left-wing governments. Either way, its independent critical voice and moderating influence would be diminished. If, on the other hand, leftist priests gain the ascendancy, the Church could become just another radical organization, of which Chile already has a plethora. The problems of identification (with leftist governments) and confrontation (toward rightist ones) would certainly produce tension and turmoil in both Church and state. The Church's vision of itself as a force for reconciliation in Chilean society would quickly become clouded. The present leadership is surely aware of the issue; and therein lies the key to a progressive future.

The most probable future of the military in Chile for the next twenty-five years will be to follow one of three courses: (1) to remain in power and rule by fiat; (2) to return the government peacefully to civilian authority; or (3) to be overturned in a counter-coup.

If the junta were to attempt to follow the first course, namely, to remain in power and rule by fiat, it would have to perceive a



continuing threat from the Marxists and the need for a repressive policy against them, and steady if not spectacular economic success. The junta would cite these two factors in an effort to legitimize its authority. In addition, the example set by the military in Brazil would certainly serve to encourage the Chilean junta to remain in power.

This course of action, however, has three main difficulties: first, Chile's solidly democratic tradition militates against it; second, the junta immediately indicated its intention of holding elections as soon as possible; and third, Chile's economy lacks strength. The third reason is particularly important. Because Chile no longer attracts foreign capital and never has had a large market size or natural advantages--and given the shaky state of Western economies in general--the military junta or any other form of government would have difficulty remaining in power for a long period of time.

The second course of action, namely, to return the government peacefully to civilian authority, seems to be the most logical one in that the junta emphatically spelled out its intention of doing so. This course, furthermore, fits in well with Chile's democratic tradition. Above all, this is what the military did in 1932, although under duress, after being in power for approximately seven years. The junta intends to make history repeat itself--without duress.

The difficulties, however, are formidable. The junta is now more interested in "solving problems" than in holding elections. In attempting to do so, it has committed serious crimes against the

Chilean people and their democratic way of life, and the seventh decade of the twentieth century is not a propitious one for well-documented criminals to leave office. In spite of its geographical isolation from the rest of the world, Chile is a particularly cosmopolitan country; trends which appear in other countries are noticed and often adopted in Chile. Thus, for example, just as the roads from the American White House and the Greek Parliament Building have led to jail or exile, the road from the Chilean Presidential Palace will more easily lead to such places than back to the barracks. Paradoxically, the democratic tradition of Chile will thus work against rather than for any attempt on the part of the junta to return the government to civilian authority. The junta now appears to be locked uncomfortably into the power it reluctantly seized and eagerly misused.

The third possible course, namely, the overthrow of the current junta in a counter-coup, presupposes that conditions will gradually deteriorate in Chile. Given the political divisions which exist in the country, its unpromising economic future, the almost total submersion of democratic values, the general ineptitude and criminal actions of the ruling junta, and the unforgetting and unforgiving milieu of the 1970s, it is difficult to see how the junta can avoid a series of counter-coup attempts. The third course thus seems to be the most likely one--whether a successful counter-coup originates from the left, the middle or the right.

By promoting internal war to preserve peace, the military has

made a costly mistake which will prove fatal. To overthrow a democratically elected Marxist government is one thing; to rule wisely in its place is quite another.

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## FOOTNOTES

1. For a different analysis, see Frank Jay Moreno, Chile: The Authoritarian Basis of Political Stability.

2. For an interesting description of the Church's opposition to the Constitution of 1925, see Frederick B. Pike, Chile and the United States, 1880-1962, pp. 182-185.

3. Liisa North, Civil-Military Relations in Argentina, Chile and Peru, p. 12.

4. US Department of the Army Pamphlet 550-77. Area Handbook for Chile (U), November 1969, pp. 34-35, 232.

5. North, p. 31.

6. Interestingly enough, Ibanez returned from exile in 1937 and campaigned frequently for the presidency--finally winning at the age of 75 in 1952, once again at a time of economic crisis after a major war. During this six year term he abandoned the dictatorial methods of his previous term.

7. Thomas G. Sanders, "The Church in Latin America," Foreign Affairs, January 1970, Vol. 48, No. 2, p. 285.

8. Area Handbook for Chile (U), pp. 200-201.

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